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Abstract
A production process involves a major shareholder and two privately informed
agents, a marketing division and an engineering unit. Production requires co-
ordinated decision making. It might be carried in a centralized organization or
through delegated contracting in a hierarchical structure. We compare the perfor-
mance of di®erent organizational structures when renegotiation of initial contracts
is possible. We show that delegated contracting always dominates centralization if
the downstream contract between the agents is observable. Contracting (respec-
tively control) should be delegated to the agent with the least (respectively most)
important information. If downstream contracts are not observable, we obtain a
tradeo® between centralization and delegation depending on parameter values.
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11 Introduction
Decentralization of decision-making is pervasive in many economic organizations. For
example, shareholders typically decentralize management of the ¯rm to professional
managers. Many ¯rms outsource part of their production process to external suppliers.
A public regulator decentralizes production decisions to a regulated private enterprise.
The structure of governments itself has some degree of decentralization since powers
may be allocated to di®erent levels of government or jurisdictions. What then are the
arguments in favor of more or less decentralization? For a long time, economists have
suggested that communication was central to the debate (Marschak, 1959; Groves and
Radner, 1972; Radner, 1983). The question was whether centralization or decentraliza-
tion performs better in the presence of exogenously speci¯ed communication costs. One
drawback of this early literature is that it neglected the incentives to reveal or withhold
information.
More recently, incentives have entered the picture, namely, incentives to provide
valuable private information to decision-makers. The basic argument in favor of decen-
tralization is that it allows economizing on communication costs since the decision is
delegated to the agent who possesses the most relevant information. The cost of do-
ing so, however, is a potential loss of control by the principal, because the agent may
not have its preferences perfectly aligned with the objectives of the principal, therefore
leading to agency costs. A basic tradeo® emerges: more decentralization economizes
on communication costs while also leading to a loss of control by the principal. The
resolution of this tradeo® potentially can lead to a theory of organizational structure.
Despite this clear enough intuition, it has been a theoretical challenge to explain
formally why decentralization of decision-making should take place in an organization.
It can be shown that any decentralized organization can be replicated by a centralized
one in which all agents report their private information to the principal, who then
makes all decisions. In the centralized organization, the principal replicates what the
agents would have done in the decentralized organization conditional on their reported
information. When the principal is committed to act as such, agents have no interest in
lying, and they therefore report truthfully their private information. This implies that
centralization is at least weakly preferred to any decentralized organization. This classic
result is known as the \Revelation Principle (Gibbard, 1973; Green and La®ont, 1977;
and Myerson, 1982). The central question then is: can the theory of incentives produce
2a tradeo® between centralization and decentralization?
The Revelation Principle gives us a useful benchmark against which any theory of
decentralization can be assessed. Any such theory must therefore start with relaxing
some assumption(s) underlying this result. A ¯rst assumption is that agents act non-
cooperatively when reporting their private information to the principal. If agents collude
and coordinate their reporting strategy, they a®ect ex ante incentives. Decentralization
may be part of the solution for avoiding collusion. Mookherjee (2006) surveys that
literature.
A second assumption is that agents are rewarded through state-contingent monetary
compensations. Those transfers are helpful tools to elicit private information. If they
are not allowed, delegation may be a better instrument to make use of the agents'
information. Recently Dessein (2002) and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) have
studied this issue.
A third assumption is that players have some commitment power that enables them
to sign a contract, and, once they have signed it, to obey the rules set out ex ante; namely,
they are committed to act upon the reported information as speci¯ed in the initial
contract. Beaudry and Poitevin (BP, 1995) show that the lack of commitment can reduce
the e±ciency of a centralized organization. In a centralized organization, one agent
communicates its information to the principal who then takes an action based on the
agents report, and as dictated by the signed contract. If players cannot commit, there are
gains to renegotiate the contract once the information has been reported since, typically,
the contract requires ex post distortions in order to extract the agent's information and
to minimize its rents. BP show that renegotiation increases the rents to the agent.
In this case, decentralizing the decision to the agent may avoid such rent costs to the
principal. When decentralizing the decision to the agent, all communication is avoided
since the agent has all relevant information to make the appropriate decision. Hence,
renegotiation cannot take place. BP show that decentralization dominates centralization
when players cannot commit not to renegotiate. One drawback of this analysis is that
it includes only one informed agent. It cannot therefore study the tradeo® between the
gains of decentralization and the loss of control for the principal. To do so, one must
introduce at least two informed agents.1
1A fourth assumption is that communication is costless. Poitevin (2000) surveys an early literature
on the relaxation of this hypothesis. Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2007) is a recent paper along those
lines.
3This paper analyzes the allocation of control over a project within an organization
with a principal and two informed agents. Each agent has some expertise over a dimen-
sion of the project. The principal may retain control over the project, thus centralizing
decision making. She may also delegate this control to either one of the agents. The ¯rst
agent becomes a middle man in a hierarchy. This agent is responsible for contracting
with the other (bottom) agent. The bottom agent has delegated decision making and
has control over the project.
Such hierarchical delegation has been studied by Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichel-
stein (MMR, 1995). Under the assumptions underlying the Revelation Principle, MMR
show that centralization and the hierarchy can implement the second-best allocation.
We assume that players cannot commit to the initial contract, and they may therefore
renegotiate it if it seems pro¯table to do so. The communication costs imposed by
renegotiation di®er whether control is centralized with the principal or delegated to
one agent. Furthermore hierarchical delegation may entail some loss of control by the
principal. This loss of control depends on whether the principal can observe or not the
contract between the middle agent and the downstream one.
When the principal can observe the downstream contract, we show that a hierarchy
is always preferred to centralization. A hierarchy minimizes communication costs by
limiting the possibility for renegotiation because the decision is delegated to the down-
stream agent who does not need to communicate. There is no loss of control by the
principal because the principal can control the interaction between the two agents in
its contract with the middle one. We show that the agent with the least important
information becomes the middle agent and the informationally most important agent is
at the bottom with control over the project.
When the principal cannot observe the downstream contract, there is a potential loss
of control. We show that centralization can dominate any hierarchical delegation when
the two agents are \informationally" similar. If one agents information is signi¯cantly
more important than that of the other, it is preferable to delegate control over the
project to one agent rather than centralizing it.
The next section introduces the model. Section 3 solves for a benchmark case and
characterizes the second-best allocation. Section 4 characterizes the centralized structure
and the hierarchical delegation for the two cases of observability and non-observability of
the downstream contract. Section 5 compares these structures. The Conclusion follows.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
42 The model
Three agents, a major shareholder F, a production or engineering unit R and a marketing
agent M, work on a project. For example, it could be bringing a new product to the
market. The shareholder is typically referred to as the principal while R and M are its
agents.
The production cost incurred by R is given by C(q;µR), where q is the size of the
project or the number of units produced. We assume that the cost function is increasing





We also assume CqµR > 0, so that a higher µR is associated with a higher marginal cost,
and CqµRµR ¸ 0.
The sale revenues to M are B(q;µM). We assume that this bene¯t function is





. We also assume that BqµM > 0, so that a higher µM is associated with
a higher marginal bene¯t, and BqµMµM · 0.
We assume that µM and µR are independently distributed random variables with
density fi and cumulative Fi for i = M;R. We make the standard assumption that the
inverse hazard rate FR(µR)=fR(µR) is increasing in µR, and that (1 ¡ FM(µM))=fM(µM)
is decreasing in µM.2 A state of nature is a vector µ = (µM;µR). Denote the set of states
of nature by £ ´ £M £ £R.
The allocation of the actual production decision for the project, that is, how much
to produce, forms part of the design of the organization. Agents R and M have their
own expertise, engineering and marketing respectively, and either one can be responsible
for the production decision. The principal F can also be responsible for the production
decision.
The project's return (net of the initial investment provided by F and which is nor-
malized to 0) is denoted by
¼(q;µ) = B(q;µM) ¡ C(q;µR):
We assume that ¼qq < 0 so that it has a unique maximum. It is maximized at q¤(µ) for
every µ 2 £. Denote the maximized pro¯t by ¼¤(µ) = ¼(q¤(µ);µ).
2Under our functional form assumptions, these standard assumptions ensure that a solution that
satis¯es \local" incentive-compatibility constraints is also globally incentive compatible.
5At this point, it is important to make some informational assumptions. The analysis
becomes interesting when agents possess some private information.3 We assume that
agent i privately observes the realization of µi.
We also assume that agents have a limited liability in that, at any point in time,
they can end the relationship if they expect to earn a negative payo®.
The object of the paper is to characterize the optimal organizational structure. The
principal can retain control over the project, in which case she has to communicate with
the agents to bene¯t from their expertise by eliciting their private information. Such
communication may entail some costs that can reduce the e±ciency of the organization.
The principal can also delegate control over the project to one agent, leaving to that
agent the task of communicating with the other agent. Under such delegation, com-
munication is limited, and hence communication costs are reduced. The principal may,
however, lose some control over the project. The optimal organizational form trades o®
communication costs associated with centralization with the loss of control associated
with delegation.
3 The benchmark case
As a benchmark for comparison, we ¯rst introduce the standard direct revelation mech-
anism. The principal and the agents sign a contract stipulating how communication
and production take place and which transfers are paid. The principal then asks the
agents to report their private information. Based on these reports, the principal makes
a production decision. The principal pays a transfer t to agent R in compensation for
production costs, and charges a fee w to agent M to extract its sales revenues. In such
mechanism, the principal retains control over the project.
The limited-liability assumption implies that agents can leave the contract at any
time. In general, such a decision would be made after the information has been reported
by both agents when agents can perfectly anticipate which production level and transfer
will take place.
The solution to this mechanism is the second-best allocation which solves the fol-





s.t., for all µ 2 £;µi;µ0
i 6= µi 2 £i;i = M;R :
LLR(µ) w(µ) ¡ C(q(µ);µR) ¸ 0
LLM(µ) B(q(µ);µM) ¡ t(µ) ¸ 0
ICM(µM) EµR[B(q(µM;µR);µM) ¡ t(µM;µR)] ¸ EµR[B(q(µ0
M;µR);µM) ¡ t(µ0
M;µR)]
ICR(µR) EµM[w(µM;µR) ¡ C(q(µM;µR);µR)] ¸ EµM[w(µM;µ0
R) ¡ C(q(µM;µ0
R);µR)]
The constraints LLi(µ) represent ex post participation (or limited liability) constraints
stipulating that agent i must get a non-negative payo® in every state of nature. The
constraints ICi(µi) represent incentive-compatible constraints stipulating that agent i
has the incentive to report truthfully its private information.
The incentives in this problem are as follows. Consider ¯rst agent R. Agent R would
like to pretend that its costs are high to obtain a high compensation from the principal.
This implies that the incentive constraints ICR(µR) are binding for every µR < ¹ µR. The
principal then holds agent R at its reservation level when its costs are the highest, and
pays rents otherwise. Hence, constraints LLR(µM; ¹ µR) for all µM 2 £M are binding.
Formally, if constraint LLR(µM; ¹ µR) is binding, we have
w(µM; ¹ µR) = C(q(µM; ¹ µR); ¹ µR);
for every µM 2 £M. When costs are highest, R is just compensated for its production
costs. For lower production costs µR < ¹ µR, transfers EµM[w(µ)] are characterized by the
binding incentive constraints ICR(µR).









for every µR 2 £R.4 In expectation over µM, R is paid for its production costs (¯rst
right-hand term) plus an incremental gain for inducing R in reporting its true costs
instead of higher costs (second right-hand term). This gain represents type µR's expected
informational rent. All lower cost types (µR < ¹ µR) receive an informational rent, while
the highest cost type gets its reservation utility.
4For a formal proof see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Mas-Collel, Whinston, and Green (1995).










The right-hand term inside the expectation operator is referred to as agent R's \virtual
cost" in Myerson (1981). The principal F must consider this virtual cost rather than
the underlying cost function C(q(µ);µR).





Expression (2) can now be rewritten as
Eµ[w(µ)] = Eµ[C(q(µ);µR) + rR(q(µ);µR)]: (3)
In expectation, R is assigned an informational rent of Eµ[rR(q(µ);µR)].
Agent M has incentives to report low bene¯ts when they are actually high to min-
imize the transfer to the principal. Symmetrically, ex post participation constraints
LLM(µM;µR) are binding for every µR 2 £R, and incentive constraints ICM(µM) are
binding for µM > µM. Formally, transfers are such that
t(µM;µR) = B(q(µM;µR);µM);









In expectation over µR, F extracts all agent M's bene¯ts net of the incremental gain
of reporting its true bene¯ts instead of misreporting lower bene¯ts. In other words,
agent M gets, in expectation, the incremental gain from reporting truthfully its infor-
mation, that is, its informational rent. All higher demand types (µM > µM) receive an
informational rent, while the lowest demand type gets its reservation utility.















Eµ[t(µ)] = Eµ[B(q(µ);µM) ¡ rM(q(µ);µM)]: (4)
In expectation, agent M's informational rent is thus Eµ[rM(q(µ);µM)].
Finally, we can solve for the second-best allocation. Substituting for the expected
transfers de¯ned in (3) and (4) into program (PSB)'s objective function yields
max
fq(µ)gµ2£
Eµ[¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ rM(q(µ);µM) ¡ rR(q(µ);µR)]:
Second-best production, denoted fqsb(µ)gµ2£, solves this maximization problem. It
represents a trade-o® between maximizing the expected total surplus Eµ[¼(q(µ);µ)] and
minimizing both agents' expected rent, Eµ[rM(q(µ);µM)] and Eµ[rR(q(µ);µR)]. Under




¼(q;µ) ¡ rM(q;µM) ¡ rR(q;µR);
for every µ 2 £. This solution has the familiar \no distortion at the top" result. In our
model, the \top" is state
¡¹ µM;µR
¢
, that is, the state with the highest demand and the









¤(¹ µM;µR) = argmax
q
¼(q; ¹ µM;µR):
In all other states, production is distorted compared to the ¯rst best. Given that




summarize, the second-best allocation entails underproduction for all types except at
the top where production is e±cient, and entails informational rents to all types except
for types ¹ µR and µM.
These results turn out to be useful for the characterization of the optimal allocations
under di®erent organizational forms.
94 Organizational forms
The Revelation Principle states that the direct mechanism of the previous section weakly
dominates any other (indirect) mechanism. It can implement the second-best allocation,
which is the best feasible incentive-compatible allocation.
A direct mechanism can be associated with a centralized organizational structure
where information, in the form of veri¯able messages, °ows from the bottom of the
organization (agents R and M) to the principal, and where control over production
resides at the top with principal F. Based on the reported information, the principal
makes the production decision. We can then reinterpret the Revelation Principle as
stating that a centralized organizational form is (weakly) optimal.
The Revelation Principle is based on a number of critical assumptions such as full
commitment, absence of collusion and complete communication.5 Under these assump-
tions, it is not relevant to study organizational forms since centralization is always
optimal.
We compare di®erent organizational structures when the assumption of full commit-
ment is relaxed. This amounts to assuming that a contract can be renegotiated whenever
agents feel this may improve their payo®. Renegotiation has some e®ect following com-
munication between the agents and the principal.6 Consequently, when renegotiation is
possible, communication can become costly. The principal may then elect to delegate
control to one agent to limit the extent of communication and, hence, the extent of
costly renegotiation. Delegation of control has, however, a cost. It may entail a loss of
control by the principal. When designing the organizational form, the principal has to
tradeo® the cost of non-commitment associated with communication and centralization
with the loss of control associated with delegation. This is this tradeo® that we study.
In what follows, we associate di®erent mechanisms with di®erent organizational
structures. We characterize a centralized and a delegation structures, and then we
compare their relative e±ciency.7
5Mookherjee (2006) and Poitevin (2000) survey some implications of these assumptions for organi-
zational study.
6See, for example, Beaudry and Poitevin (1995).
7A formal characterization of these structures is in the Appendix.
104.1 Centralization
The centralized structure is represented by the direct mechanism of the previous section.
We have shown that the principal implements some allocative distortions to extract the
agents' information and limit their informational rents. Now suppose that the principal
cannot commit to the original contract. Once the agents have reported their private
information, there are strong incentives to renegotiate away the allocative distortions.
Along the equilibrium path agents report truthfully. The principal then learns the
true state µ through Bayesian updating. Any renegotiation therefore takes place under
\symmetric" information. If the production decision is not e±cient, the principal can
renegotiate to the e±cient output q¤(µ) conditional on the reported truthful information
µ. The gain in e±ciency can be shared among all three agents such that the renegotiation
is always accepted. It then leads to ¯rst-best production, that is, to q¤(µ) for every
µ 2 £.8
The equilibrium allocation is characterized by the solution to problem (PSB) with
outputs being given by q¤(µ). Principal F's ex ante payo® is
S
C




Agent R's ex ante payo® is
S
C
R = Eµ [rR(q
¤(µ);µR)]:
Agent M's ex ante payo® is
S
C
M = Eµ [rM(q
¤(µ);µM)]:
The principal F gets the ¯rst-best expected surplus net of informational rents conceded
to agents R and M. These rents are higher than in the second-best case since the
principal cannot use distortions to limit these rents because such distortions would be
renegotiated away.
Centralization allows the principal to retain full control of production but it entails
a loss in terms of rents to the agents due to communication and limited commitment.
Since communication is costly, the principal may attempt to limit it by delegating to
one of the agents.
8This argument is shown formally in Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) in a model with one agent.
114.2 Hierarchical delegation
There are many, possibly complex, hierarchical structures that can be designed. To avoid
having to study all possible hierarchical structures (since they cannot all be nested), we
focus on one interesting hierarchical mechanism that has been studied by Melumad,
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1995) (MMR) and that has a natural interpretation. This
mechanism constitutes the formal representation of our hierarchical organizational form.
In this mechanism, the principal interacts with agent i, and she delegates to i the
governing of the relationship with agent j as follows. The principal signs a (upstream)
contract with agent i. Both agents then observe their private information. Agent i
communicates to the principal its private information. The principal may then attempt
to renegotiate the contract with agent i. Following this renegotiation, agent i signs a
(downstream) contract with agent j to make the production decision.
Many points are worth noting here. First, MMR have shown that, if one abstracts
from renegotiation, the second-best allocation can be implemented with this hierarchi-
cal mechanism. This implies that any loss in e±ciency is not due to the hierarchical
structure but rather to the lack of commitment. We show below that the introduction of
renegotiation between the principal and agent i has non-trivial e®ects on the e±ciency
of the allocation.
Second, renegotiation has no e®ect on the downstream contract between the two
agents. This contract can take the form of a renegotiation-proof non-linear schedule for
which no communication is necessary. Hence, there is no basis for renegotiation, and
the costs of renegotiation can therefore be alleviated costlessly for this contract.9
Finally, we consider alternative assumptions about the observability by the principal
of the downstream contract between the two agents. We ¯rst assume that the principal
can monitor the downstream contract, hence production, between the two agents. Al-
ternatively we consider the case where the principal cannot observe neither the contract
between the two agents nor production. The loss of control due to delegation may vary
with the observability of the downstream contract since it a®ects the extent of control
that the principal can exert.
9See Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) or Cr¶ emer (1995).
124.2.1 Observable downstream contract
We assume that the principal can observe the contract between the two agents, and that
she can base the upstream contract on it. Suppose that the principal signs a contract
with agent M who must in turn contract with agent R. A typical contract between the
principal and agent M has the following form. Agent M pays the principal a transfer
t(^ µM;q) which depends on the message ^ µM that agent M sends to the principal as well
as on the production level q. Furthermore, the contract between the two agents can
depend on this message. This dependence allows the principal to control to some extent
the downstream contract. The principal e®ectively o®ers agent M a menu of possible
downstream contracts from which agent M selects an element by reporting its type.
The principal can then retain indirectly some control over the downstream relationship
through this menu. This is possible only if the downstream contract is observable. The
next section presents the case where it is not observable.
As argued above, the downstream contract has the following structure: w(^ µM;q),
that is, it is a non-linear price schedule. Agent R is presented with this contract. It
selects a production level q and it is then remunerated according to w(^ µM;q). Since
this contract does not require any communication between the two agents, it is not
a®ected by the possibility for renegotiation. Note that this contract can depend on the
communication between M and F.
A natural question is whether the principal can implement or not the second-best
allocation qsb when renegotiation is possible. On the equilibrium path, type µM reports
its true type to the principal, that is, ^ µM = µM. Consider a type ~ µM 6= ¹ µM which
reports truthfully to the principal. Conditional on its truthful report ^ µM, the allocation
fqsb(~ µM;µR)gµR2£R is not second-best e±cient since it includes distortions for all types
µR, while it should not in state (~ µM;µR) which is the top conditional on ~ µM.10 There is,
therefore, an opportunity to renegotiate the allocation fqsb(~ µM;µR)gµR2£R conditional
on the true type ~ µM. Such renegotiation would give the same payo® to agent M but
it would eliminate the distortion at the (conditional) top (~ µM;µR), and possibly also
reduce distortions in other states. This renegotiation would increase the payo® to the
principal conditional on the realization ~ µM.
Based on this informal argument, it is possible to characterize the optimal allocation.






















s.t., for all µR;µ
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The solution to this problem yields a second-best optimal allocation conditional on type
~ µM denoted by fqDM(~ µM;µR)gµR2£R. We can show that, for all µR, qDM(~ µM;µR) solves
max
q
¼(q;(~ µM;µR)) ¡ rR(q;µR):
The vector of all such allocations is qDM(µ), often simply denoted qDM. We can show
that the optimal allocation in the hierarchical organizational form is qDM, that is, an
allocation which is e±cient conditional on the true type of agent M. This allocation
has less output distortions than the second-best allocation has where distortions were
used to extract agent M's information and to limit its informational rents. This implies
that more informational rents have to be conceded to agent M to extract its private
information. The optimal solution is then the solution to program (PSB) with outputs
being given by qDM.











































A similar problem can be written when the principal F delegates to agent R. The
principal pays to R a transfer w(^ µR;q) where ^ µR represents the message that agent R
sends to the principal. The contract between M and R consists of a non-linear price
schedule t(^ µR;q) paid by M to R, and may depend on communication between agent R

















s.t., for all µM;µ
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The solution to this problem yields a second-best optimal allocation conditional on
type ~ µR denoted by fqDR(µM; ~ µR)gµM2£M or qDR(µ). We can show that, for all µM,
qDR(µM; ~ µR) solves
max
q
¼(q;(µM; ~ µR)) ¡ rM(q;µM):
In this allocation, no distortions are present in all states (¹ µM; ~ µR)~ µR2£R. This is di®erent




As in the previous case, the optimal allocation when the principal delegates to agent
R is given by the solution to program (PSB) with outputs being given by qDR.











































The hierarchical structure can be given a di®erent interpretation. Consider the case
in which the principal delegates to agent M. Agent M is responsible for contracting
with agent R. When the downstream contract is observable, the principal can solicit
M's information and then contract with agent R. The contract o®ered to R is a non-
linear price schedule and it is based on agent M's reported information. Agent M's
remuneration is based on the o®ered contract since it is observable. So, formally, the
hierarchical structure can be interpreted as a hierarchy or it can be interpreted as an
15organization in which the principal has a \line" relationship with agent R and a \sta®"
one with agent M. This equivalence is only possible when the downstream contract is
observable since M's remuneration depends on the contract signed with agent R.
Before comparing this hierarchical structure with the centralized structure, we char-
acterize the solution to the hierarchical structure when the downstream contract is not
observable to the principal.
4.2.2 Non-observable downstream contract
We assume that the principal cannot observe production and the contract between the
two agents. Consequently, the downstream contract cannot depend on the communica-
tion between the middle agent and the principal. The potential loss of control is greater
than when the downstream contract is observable since the principal cannot in°uence
the relationship between the two agents.
A typical contract with, say agent M, has the following form. Agent M pays the
principal a transfer t(^ µM) which depends on the message ^ µM that agent M sends to the
principal. Since the downstream contract cannot depend on this message, it has the
following structure: w(q), that is, it is a (renegotiation-proof) non-linear price schedule
which does not require any communication between the two agents. This contract can
still depend on the type of agent M since di®erent types of agent M can o®er di®erent
non-linear schedules.
We ¯rst note that the principal cannot implement the second-best allocation when
the downstream contract is non-observable. The principal has less control than when it
is observable and hence, she cannot achieve more e±ciency.
The only instrument available to the principal is the transfer t(^ µM). This implies
that it must be constant since agent M always reports the type associated with the
lowest transfer. The transfer is then set to ensure that all participation constraints for
agent M are satis¯ed.
Agent M o®ers to agent R a contract that implements an e±cient allocation con-
ditional on its own type and agent R's private information. Such allocation is given
by qDM(µ). Given this allocation, the transfer must be set to ¼(qDM(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR))
which is agent M's lowest payo® of all possible states.






DM(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)
¢
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DM(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)
¢¤
:
A similar analysis applies when the principal F delegates to agent R. In this case,
the optimal allocation is qDR(µ). Given this allocation, the transfer must be set to
¼(qDR(µM; ¹ µR);µM; ¹ µR)) which is agent R's lowest payo® of all possible states.
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DR(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)
¢¤
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5 Comparison of the centralized and hierarchical
structures
We now compare the relative e±ciency of the organizational forms under the alternative
assumptions about the observability of the downstream contract. The comparison is
based on the expected payo® to the principal.
5.1 Observable downstream contract
We ¯rst compare how the hierarchical structure fares against the centralized one.
Proposition 1 Both hierarchical structures yield a higher payo® to the principal than
the centralized structure does, that is, SDi
F > SC
F .
17The intuition for this result goes as follows. In the centralized structure, renegotiation
imposes ex post e±ciency on production in all states of nature. Since no distortion can
be used, the principal pays large rents to agents to induce truthful revelation. With
the hierarchical structures, renegotiation has some e®ect only following the report of
the middle agent. A renegotiation-proof non-linear price schedule can be used for the
downstream contract. This limits the costs imposed by renegotiation, and therefore
limits the rents the principal has to pay to the agents. The cost of the hierarchical
structure is that the incentive constraints of the bottom agent hold for all types of the
middle agent, while they hold in expectation under centralization. In our setting with
risk-neutral preferences, this has no consequence. It is easy to show that the allocation
can be implemented in dominant strategy.11
When the downstream contract is observable, the loss of control due to delegating
to the middle agent is minimized. Our result then shows that the principal always does
better by delegating than by retaining full control. Doing so limits the extent of costly
communication and entails no loss of control.
This establishes that the principal prefers delegating to an agent. The next question
is now which agent should be the middle man in the hierarchy. The principal is not,
in general, indi®erent between the two hierarchical structures. It is hard to provide
comparisons for the two hierarchies for general functional forms. We therefore use the
following (standard) parameterization. Despite its speci¯city, it still allows us to convey
important intuitions about the involved tradeo®s.
Assumption 1 Let B(q;µM) = (µM ¡ q=2)q and C(q;µR) = µRq.
Under Assumption 1, the ¯rst-best outputs and pro¯ts are respectively
q
¤(µ) = µM ¡ µR and ¼
¤(µ) = (µM ¡ µR)
2=2;








for all µR 2 £R and µM 2 £M. The distorted outputs are
q




DM(µ) = µM ¡ µR ¡
FR(µR)
fR(µR);
11For example, see Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992).























































F yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, the principal prefers to delegate to agent M than












Delegation to M is preferred when its associated agency costs are lower than when
delegating to R. When the types µi are uniformly distributed on [µi; ¹ µi] for i = M;R,
the above condition reduces to
¢µR ´ ¹ µR ¡ µR ¸ ¹ µM ¡ µM ´ ¢µM:
Delegation to M is preferred if and only if M's private information has lower variance.
With a Uniform distribution, the di®erence in expected agency costs is proportional to
the di®erence in the variance of private information of the two agents.
In a hierarchy, the principal prefers to delegate to the \least important" agent since
doing so implies that the most important agent, that is, the agent for which the infor-
mation is most crucial (has largest variance), is at the bottom of the hierarchy making
the output decision based on its crucial information. The least important agent becomes
a middle man transmitting information to the bottom of the hierarchy and leaving the
bottom agent make the (important) output decision. Such structure minimizes the cost
imposed by renegotiation.
Suppose that we interpret the principal F as a venture capitalist providing funds
to an innovating ¯rm. Suppose that the variance of development costs is high relative
to that of demand. This could occur if the innovation is about a new technology for
producing an existing good. One would expect that an innovating ¯rm be managed by
19marketing but that control would be delegated to the R&D division. For example, it
seems plausible that development costs are more variable than revenues in the pharma-
ceutical industry. Our model would predict that pharmaceutical ¯rms would be headed
by the marketing division with the research and development division being at the bot-
tom of the hierarchy, or even external to the ¯rm, but with e®ective control over the
project. If the variance of revenues is high relative to development costs, for example
for a new product, our model would predict that innovating ¯rms would be headed by
their research unit with marketing being at the bottom of the hierarchy and in control
of the project.
5.2 Non-observable downstream contract
We ¯rst compare the two hierarchical structures. When the principal cannot observe the
downstream contract, we have shown that delegation entails a signi¯cant loss of control
for the principal. Because the principal cannot monitor the downstream contract, it has
to concede large rents to the middle agent, and the principal gets a payo® equal to the
pro¯ts in the worst state (µM; ¹ µR).
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, the principal prefers delegating to agent M than







When the downstream contract is non-observable, agency costs when delegating to agent
M are proportional to 1=fR(¹ µR), that is, the inverse of the density at the worst state.
A similar expression can be computed when delegating to agent R. The principal then
prefers delegating to the agent with the lowest associated agency costs.
When types µi are uniformly distributed on [µi; ¹ µi] for i = M;R, the above condition
reduces to
¢µM ¸ ¢µR:
This last condition yields the opposite ranking as to when the downstream contract is
observable. When comparing the expressions in Propositions 2 and 3, however, it does
not seem that this result is general. In Proposition 2, the comparison depends on the
whole distribution of states, while it only depends on the worst state in Proposition 3.
20Even though this result may be speci¯c to our modelization, it still highlights the
possibility that it may be optimal to delegate control to the least important agent. For
example, when ¢µM ¸ ¢µR, agent M is the most important agent informationally,
but the optimal hierarchical structure gives control over the project to agent R by
putting agent M as the middle agent. This result contradicts the \Delegation principle"
which states that control shall be in the hands of the informed agent, that is, the most
important agent in the context of our model.
When the downstream contract is not observable, there is an interesting result.
Centralization may be preferred to delegation depending on parameter values.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1 and types uniformly distributed on [µi; ¹ µi] for i =




· ¢µR · 2¢µM:
When the downstream contract is not observable, there is a loss of control for the
principal. The principal may then prefer to retain control over the production decision.
This occurs when each agent's information is not too variable compared to that of the
other agent. In this case, there is no advantage to delegation since it is bene¯cial to
delegate when one agent's information is relatively more important. If the two agents
are informationally similar, that is, if ¢µR is su±ciently close to ¢µM, then the principal
prefers to centralize to avoid the loss of control and rents associated with delegation.
In summary, when the principal can monitor the downstream contract, its loss of
control from delegation is minimal and delegation is thus always preferred to central-
ization. When the downstream contract is not observable, the principal may prefer to
centralize if the two agents are informationally similar.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the relative e±ciency of centralization as compared to delegation.
We show that it depends on the tradeo® between communication costs necessary in a
centralized structure and the loss of control associated with delegation.
Communication costs result from renegotiation. It a®ects the rents-e±ciency tradeo®
and leads to higher rents for the agents. The loss of control under delegation also implies
21that the principal has to pay more rents to the agents to retain some (indirect) control.
We show that the extent of the loss of control depends on whether the principal can
exert some control over the downstream interaction between agents.
When the principal can fully monitor the downstream interaction, centralization is
never optimal. Delegation goes to the least informationally important agent so that
control over the project is delegated to the more important agent at the bottom of the
hierarchy. When the principal cannot monitor the downstream interaction, centraliza-
tion may be optimal when the two agents are similar in an informational sense. If they
di®er, centralization is dominated by delegation to one of the agent.
Our set-up has natural applications. For example, the principal might be a major
shareholder who launches a new product for which production cost and demand are
uncertain and privately known by specialized agents. The principal might opt for a
centralized organization, thereby being involved in both production and retailing and
retaining control. Or she may delegate decision making and contracting to the special-
ized agents, engineering or marketing, who then enter into an outsourcing relationship,
sign a licensing agreement or form technological alliance.12
Our paper relates the optimal organization structure to the observability of the con-
tract between the informed parties which has practical meaning. For instance, patent
licensing agreements are required by law to be public while supplier-retailer contracts
often contain secret clauses. Our results also link the allocation of control in delegated
hierarchies with the variance of the two informational uncertainties that are the pro-
duction costs and the demand for the new product. Their relative magnitude di®er
from one innovation to another. Technological-push innovations such as improved exist-
ing products tend to yield lower demand uncertainty but higher cost uncertainty than
demand-pull innovations.
12Lerner and Merges (1998) provides an empirical analysis on technological alliances between biotech
¯rms and pharmaceutical company which exhibit explicit allocation of control and cash-°ow rights.
22Appendix
In this Appendix we provide proofs for the characterizations presented in the main
text.
A Centralization
We argue in the text that the implemented outputs under centralization and renegotia-
tion are the ex post e±cient output q¤(µ) for all µ. Beaudry and Poitevin (1995) prove
this result with one agent. It is easy to generalize their proof for two agents when the
private information of each agent does not directly enter the payo®s of the other agent
and the principal. The vector of outputs fq¤(µ)g is therefore renegotiation-proof. The
optimal transfers must then be the solution to (PSB) for the outputs q¤(µ).
B Hierarchical structure with observable downstream
contract
In this section, we ¯rst characterize the contracts implemented in both hierarchical
structures when the downstream contract is observable. We then show that the im-
plemented contracts are not renegotiated. Finally, we show that any other contract is
either dominated or renegotiated.
Step 1 Characterization of the contract
The implemented contracts when contracting is delegated to M are:
















where ¿ is a function mapping R+ £ £M to £R such that ¿(qDM(µM;µR);µM) = µR for
every µ 2 £. The transfer w corresponds to a non-linear schedule for remunerating agent
R as a function of the output it produces. Note that since this contract is observable to
the principal, it depends on the communication between agent M and the principal.
We show that these contracts are incentive-compatible and ex post individual ratio-
nal.
23R's ex post payo® is



















This expression is satis¯ed if q = qDM(µM;µR). Furthermore, it is always possible to
choose the function ¿ such that this solution is a global maximum. Therefore, R has
incentive to implement qDM(µM;µR) when µR is realized and when its wage is w(µM;q).
It is easy to check that agent R's participation constraint is satis¯ed for all µM.
Given the expected behavior of agent R, M's interim payo® when revealing truthfully
µM is









This is the incremental gain for M of reporting its true demand in expectation over µR.
It guarantees that its interim incentive-compatibility constraints hold. With the imple-








which is obviously non-negative.
Symmetrically, the contracts implemented when contracting is delegated to R are:

















where ¿0 is a function mapping R+ £ £R to £M such that ¿0(qDR(µM;µR);µR) = µM for
every µ 2 £. A similar proof as that above can be used to show that these contracts
satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality while implementing qDR.
Step 2 The implemented contracts are not renegotiated
24First, it is easy to show that the downstream contract is not renegotiated. Con-
ditional on the type of the middle agent, it is interim e±cient. Furthermore, it does
not require any communication between the two agents because it takes the form of a
non-linear schedule. This implies that the contract cannot be successfully renegotiated.
A similar argument is made in Beaudry and Poitevin (1995).
Second, consider the contract between the middle agent and the principal. Given
the downstream contract that is expected to be signed and implemented, the upstream
contract is e±cient for each type of the middle agent. Because of this, any renegotiation
acceptable to one party would not be acceptable to the other party. It therefore cannot
be renegotiated.
We now show that any other contract is either dominated or renegotiated.
Step 3 Any pooling contract is renegotiated
Suppose that the upstream contract between the middle agent and the principal is
pooling on the type of the middle agent. No communication is then required between
these two players.
Because the single-crossing property holds, it can be shown that the downstream
contract is separating, that is, di®erent types of the middle agent o®er di®erent contracts.
Furthermore this downstream contract can be implemented without renegotiation using
a non-linear schedule. The ¯nal allocation is then separating along the downstream
agent's type but pooling along the middle agent's type.
The maximal payo® that the principal can get from a pooling allocation when i is






This payo® is clearly dominated by SDi
F . The principal would therefore o®er the contract
implementing qDi.13
Step 4 Any separating contract that implements another production schedule than
qDi will be renegotiated
Conditional on the truthful revelation of µi, the highest expected surplus that i can







Eµj[¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ rj(q(µ);µj)]: (5)
13Implicitly, we do assume here that the principal can \choose" the highest payo® equilibrium if there
were multiple equilibria.
25Any other implemented separating contract either leaves room for renegotiation between
agent i and F, or is dominated by the contract implementing qDi.
This completes the argument that qDi is implemented when the downstream contract
is observable.
C Hierarchical structure with non-observable down-
stream contract
In this section, we characterize the contracts implemented in both hierarchical structures
when the downstream contract is not observable.
Step 1 Characterization of the downstream contract
Since the downstream contract is non-observable, it cannot be a®ected by the con-
tract between the principal and the middle agent. Agent i then o®ers to agent j a
non-linear schedule implementing qDi. This contract is interim e±cient conditional on
agent i's type.
Step 2 Characterization of the upstream contract
The contract between agent i and the principal cannot depend on output or the
downstream contract. It must therefore be a constant payment. This payment is such
that all participation constraints for agent i are satis¯ed. It is equal to pro¯ts in the
worst state: ¼(qDi(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)).
It is clear that these contracts are the unique contracts that can be implemented
when the downstream contract is non-observable.
D Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider the case where agent M is the middle agent.













Since ¼(¢;µ) is strictly concave for every µ, the later inequalities imply qDM(µ) · q¤(µ)




26Second, by de¯nition, qDM maximizes Eµ [¼(q(µ);µ) ¡ rR(q(µ);µR)]. Therefore, since










The above inequality combined with (6) leads to SDM
F > S¤
F.
The proof for the case where agent R is the middle agent is similar. It is therefore
omitted.
E Proof of Proposition 2
The inequality in the statement of the proposition follows directly from comparing SDM
F
and SDR
F , and simplifying terms.
F Proof of Proposition 3
Under Assumption 1,
¼(q;(µM; ¹ µR)) =
³



















DM(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)) =
µ















DR(µM; ¹ µR);(µM; ¹ µR)) =
µ











Straightforward computation shows that ¹ SDM
F ¸ ¹ SDR
F leads to fR(¹ µR) ¸ fM(µM).
27G Proof of Proposition 4







2(µM ¡ ¹ µR)























(¹ µM ¡ ¹ µR)(2µM ¡ ¹ µM ¡ ¹ µR)
Straightforward computation leads to the statement of the proposition.
H Proof of Proposition 5









































Applying the expectation operator over µ shows that the expected pro¯t is higher in
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